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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, February 9, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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| USSR - MIDDLE EAST: Relations   |      |
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|   |      |
| The USSR presumably fears that Syria, which has hither erto shared Soviet opposition to the US-negotiated Sinai-II agreement, is falling into line with Egypt's view that the US holds the key to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. The Soviets have recently criticized the Egyptians again for emphasizing the US role in the Arab-Israeli settlement process.   |      |
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| Soviet press commentary indicates that the USSR is also concerned that Palestinian factionalism will make the PLO susceptible to Arab pressures for a Palestinian state with strong ties to Jordan. Following last month's joint statement by Egypt and Jordan favoring such a state, the USSR downgraded the scheme as one supported by Israel and opposed by the PLO. Soviet broadcasts stressed that any linkage between Jordan and a Palestinian state would suit Israel's long-standing interest in imposing a "trusteeship" on the Palestinians within a feder- |      |

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ated framework.

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| 25X1 | The Soviets continue to favor a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza as a potential client in the area. A state with strong ties to Jordan, however, would mean a further erosion of the Soviet position in the Middle East.   | 25X <sup>2</sup> |
|------|--|------------------|
|      | ISRAEL-SYRIA-LEBANON: Troop Movements  |                  |
| 25X1 | //The Israelis have apparently moved some combat forces to northern Israel in case they have to follow through on demands that Syrian troops pull back from southern Lebanon. According to the US army attache in Tel Aviv, major elements of a 3,000-man infantry brigade began moving Mondaypresumably northwardfrom camps on the west bank of the Jordan.//   |                  |
| 25X1 | //The brigade was scheduled to begin a major exercise on the west bank yesterday, but  | 25X <sup>2</sup> |
| 25X1 | the exercise has been canceled indefi- nitely. The Israelis reportedly are attempting to conceal the movement of the brigade from Jordanian observation.//   | 20/              |
| 25X1 | Israeli officials continue to express concern about the Syrian presence in southern Lebanon. According to the press, the chief of staff said on Monday that Israel is now making decisions about the situation.  |                  |
| 25X1 | //The Israelis fear that Syria will strengthen its positions and make further encroachments in southern Lebanon if the movement of Syrian troops into the area goes uncontested. The Israelis say the Syrians are not implementing their avowed purpose for moving south—collecting heavy weapons from the opposing factions. Even if the Israelis are contemplating military operations to force a Syrian withdrawal, they would probably await the results of Secretary Vance's pending visit.// |                  |
| 25X1 |  |                  |
| 25X1 | USSR-CHINA: Propaganda Moratorium  In a Moscow domestic broadcast on February 4, Izvestia commentator Bovin issued the first direct criticism of China in  |                  |

Soviet media since the death of Mao Tse-tung last September.

| 25X1 | The commentary said Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has dismantled the "Maoist legacy" in Chinese economic, cultural, and educational affairs but lamented the fact that China is still carrying on the "old anti-Soviet line."  |     |
|------|--|-----|
| 25X1 | The commentary may be the USSR's response to increased anti-Soviet propaganda from China. For the last three weeks, Chinese propaganda on the USSR has been nearly at the level it was before Mao's death.   |     |
| 25X1 | Bovin's comments are unlikely to be picked up by other Soviet media, at least for a while. Moscow wants to keep alive the possibility of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations if only to enhance its bargaining power with the US. Resumption of attacks against China will in all probability be gradual and will become full-scale only after the USSR has made some progress in its relations with the US. |     |
| 25X1 | Equally important will be the Soviet assessment of the internal situation in China. Soviet press coverage and private comments suggest that the Soviets believe the Chinese leadership still has not stabilized. Moscow has probably been encouraged by the Chinese moderates' purge of the "gang of four" and probably still has some hope for an easing in Sino-Soviet tensions.                               | 25X |
|      | NAMIBIA: Progress in Talks   |     |
| 25X1 | In an interview on Friday, Sam Nujoma, president of the South-West Africa Peoples Organization, strongly reemphasized SWAPO's conditions for coming to the conference table on a Namibian settlement:  |     |
|      | The South African government must release all political prisoners.   |     |

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convenes.

--Pretoria must commit itself to the withdrawal of all military, security, and police forces before a conference

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security.

--Representation at the conference must be confined to a Namibian delegation, a South African delegation, and the UN, which will convene and chair the conference. SWAPO, he implied, would represent Namibia. Nujoma also avowed that SWAPO does not belong to any political bloc, although he said it gets "large donations from Soviet Russia and the Nordic states." Nujoma's statements reflect confidence in his position and in SWAPO's ability to achieve power in Namibia by force, no matter how long it takes. SWAPO is playing no role in the South African sponsored constitutional conference on independence for Namibia at Windhoek. The conference is reportedly making some headway. Substantial portions of a draft constitution for an interim government that would prepare for final independence have been completed. Dirk Mudge, the moderate white chairman of the small drafting committee set up to reconcile divergent proposals from one white and ten nonwhite delegations, believes the draft will be completed by mid-March. He believes it will be promptly accepted by the full conference, passed by the South African parliament, and that an interim government can be set up as early as June. Although Mudge has previously been overly optimistic on progress, the current momentum indicates that South African Prime Minister Vorster has finally put pressure on the conservative white delegates, and he is likely to push the enabling legislation through parliament. From the draft text so far available, it is apparent that each of the ethnic groups--including the whites--will be represented equally on the council of ministers in the interim government, and decisions are to be by consensus. Although the central government will control a number of important ministries, South Africa will be responsible, during the period of

interim government, for defense, foreign affairs, and internal

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| 25X1 | The draft also appears to rule out any accommodation with SWAPO. Although the bill of rights guarantees freedom to form political parties, it excludes parties with "Marxist-Leninist ideology," and Prime Minister Vorster maintains that SWAPO is a Marxist party.  | 25X′         |
|------|---|--------------|
|      | SOUTH AFRICA: New Naval Base  |              |
| 25X1 | South Africa reportedly plans to construct a small naval facility at Richard's Bay, near the Mozambican border, by the end of the year.   |              |
| 25X1 | //According to the US consulate in Durban, the South African navy will station patrol craft and a few of its minesweepers at the new base. The minesweepers, like most of South Africa's navy, are normally based at Simonstown, near Capetown.//   |              |
| 25X1 | //The new facility would give the South African navy another base in addition to Port Elizabeth and Durban from which to monitor seaborne traffic in the Mozambique Channel. Richard's Bay is only about 320 kilometers from the Mozambican capital of Maputo and would also provide the South African navy with a closer base for operations against Mozambique.// |              |
| 25X1 | //South Africa has been developing the area around Richard's Bay since the early 1970s. Railroad yards and terminals, a large port, and an airfield, which could handle military aircraft, are already under construction there.//  | <b>25X</b> 1 |
|      | TURKEY: New Strains on Coalition  |              |
| 25X1 | Turkey's four-party coalition government is under new strains because one of the minor parties has threatened to withdraw from the coalition and because of its failure to curb political violence.   |              |
| 25X1 | The small centrist Republican Reliance Party, which views itself as the guardian of Kemal Ataturk's secular reforms, is increasingly disturbed by the growing influence of  |              |

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the Islamic-fundamentalist National Salvation Party and the political violence precipitated by supporters of the extremeright Nationalist Action Party. Republic Reliance leader Feyzioglu has threatened to withdraw from the government if the coalition cannot adhere to its program and if stronger measures are not taken to control civil disorders.

Withdrawal of the Reliance Party, which only has a few seats in parliament, probably would not bring down the government but would clearly weaken it. Another destabilizing factor would be the reported establishment of a new rightist political party made up of 10 to 20 dissident deputies from Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan's Salvationists. It is not certain, however, that the dissidents would abandon the coalition.

The government is facing two important votes on the budget--one in mid-February and one at the end of the month. If dissension within the coalition gets further out of hand, the government could conceivably lose one of these votes. This would not require Prime Minister Demirel to step down, but precedent and what may be Demirel's own feeling that the coalition's liabilities are beginning to outweigh its advantages could lead him to do so.

The Supreme Military Council--consisting of senior civilian and military leaders--is meeting this week to review Turkey's general military position and domestic security problems. Presumably it will recommend stronger legal and police measures to curb the present wave of violence, possibly including the imposition of martial law in certain provinces. Demirel has been hamstrung in his efforts to control the violence because of lack of cooperation from his two rightist coalition partners.

Opposition Senator Batur, who as air force chief of staff led the "coup by memorandum" in 1971 that forced the resignation of the government, attempted to link past and present this week in parliament. He noted that in 1971 the government had been forced out after five students had been killed and that the death toll in the present wave of student violence has now exceeded 100. Because of the loyalty of senior officers, however, there appears to be almost no chance of military intervention at this point.

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|      | SPAIN: Liberalizing Election Laws  |    |
|------|--|----|
| 25X1 | The Spanish government's modification yesterday of the law on political associations paves the way for most partiesperhaps even the Communistto participate in the national election this spring.  |    |
| 25X1 | The cabinet formally approved a plan, to which Prime Minister Suarez and opposition leaders reportedly agreed last month, that will allow all parties to register but leaves the delicate question of legality to the Supreme Court.   |    |
| 25X1 | A Socialist Workers' Party source yesterday noted that under existing law the court has 30 days to decide on a registering party's acceptability. Should it fail to rule against the Communists or any other party within this period, legalization would be automatic.  |    |
| 25X1 | By leaving the door ajar for the Communists to take part, the government thus overcomes the objections of several major opposition parties, such as the Christian Democratic and the Socialist, which have demanded equal treatment for all parties in the coming election. Participation by these parties now seems assured, regardless of how the court rules on the Communists. |    |
| 25X1 | A favorable ruling on Communist participation by the court, rather than by government decree, reportedly will be more acceptable to the military and to the political right.   | ×́ |
|      | EC: Soviet Fisheries   |    |
| 25X1 | //The UK reportedly is prepared to take strong action against Soviet fishermen if they continue to fish illegally in EC waters.//  |    |
| 25X1 | //The UK, acting on behalf of the Community, told the USSR, Poland, and East Germany last month that they must submit by February 7 a list of ships that would be licensed to fish in the EC's 200-nautical-mile zone. Under the EC plan, 17   |    |

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Soviet and 5 Polish and East German trawlers could fish at the same time in EC waters while long-term reciprocal fishing agreements were being negotiated.//

//The Soviets agreed last week to begin negotiations on a fishing agreement with the UK, representing the EC, but refused to submit its list, insisting that the number of trawlers should also be included in the negotiations. According to EC estimates, more than 70 Soviet trawlers are now fishing in EC waters, and it is unlikely the EC would agree to any increase given the urgent need to conserve Community fish stocks.//

//Poland and East Germany, however, submitted
lists and their trawlers are now fishing legally in EC waters.//

//The UK will seek parliamentary action this week to bring the licensing system into effect for UK waters. If the Soviets continue to refuse to submit to the licensing procedure, the British plan to inform the Soviet trawlers that they are not licensed to fish in UK waters and ask them to depart.//

//The Soviets would then be told through the UK empassy in Moscow that they must produce a list or withdraw their trawlers while negotiations on a fishing agreement proceed. If they refuse, the Soviet trawlers would be warned that they are subject to arrest and would be arrested if they did not depart within 48 hours.//

//According to a Foreign Ministry official, the UK would consult with the US and NATO prior to making an arrest if any resistance from the Soviets was anticipated.//

//Although Soviet officials in London have warned that any action against Soviet vessels would be a terrible error and that the British government "would have to face the consequences," there are indications the Soviets are becoming more flexible.//

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**Top Secret**